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Aclear-cut ranking of factors underlyingprice differentiationof banks’newbusinesscalls for the analy-
sis of data at the operation level. Unfortunately, such a database is not readily available for retail bank
loans for all euro area countries. With that in mind, this paper is intended to derive general results for
the loan market in the euro area by making use of a rich database of syndicated loans at the operation
level (for a description of the functioning of the syndicated loan market see Gadanecz (2004)). This
market is usually identified as a transaction market for more transparent companies or projects, a fea-
ture that suggests that it should be more integrated cross-border than the market for bank loans at
large. In fact, the direct reading of the information available for the primary market shows up a wide-
spread presence of non-resident banks in each syndicate, in many cases acting as leading managers
of the operations. Notwithstanding those considerations, the present study intends to evaluate if the
theoretical predictions in the literature concerning factors for interest rate differentiation among bor-
rowers are observed in the syndicated loans to euro area corporations, and it intends also to verify if
cross-country differences persist after controlling for economically relevant factors.
1 In particular, this
work provides some evidence of home bias in the syndicated loan market in the euro area, i.e. opera-
tions conducted exclusively by banks whose nationality was different from that of the borrower pre-
sented systematically higher spreads than those operations in which at least a bank with the same
nationality was present. Given the more transactional nature of syndicated loans than average bank
loans and the a priori evidence of deep cross-border bank presence in this market, there is a case for
consideringthese results as a starting counterfactual for more general conclusions on the cross-coun-
try integration of corporate bank loans in the euro area. To be sure, based on these findings, it should
not be surprising if future empirical studies based on retail operations concluded for the lack of or
incomplete integration of the several national corporate bank loan markets in the euro area.
According to ECB (2006), cross-country differences in aggregate statistics are observed in the euro
area,whichmaybeassociatedtoalargesetoffactors.Amongthese,differencesinproductcharacter-
istics and in the market environment were identified, as well as structural issues related to the aggre-
gation of interest rates in individual operations. The evidence uncovered in this study may also inform
the ongoing debate on the fine-tuning of economically meaningfully breakdowns in the euro area offi-
cial statistics on bank loan interest rates aggregate statistics.
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* WearegratefultoAntónioAntunes,DianaBonfim,PaulaAntãoandLuísaFarinhafortheircommentsandsuggestionsonpreliminaryversionsofthiswork.
The usual disclaimer applies.
** Economics and Research Department.
(1) The available empirical literature is focused essentially on the loans market to corporations in the United States. In particular, it is worth mentioning the
resultsobtainedinAngbazoetal(1998),whoidentifiedrelevantfactorsinpricedeterminationintheriskiersegmentofsyndicatedloansmarket,andtested
for the existence of a relation between this market and the bond market. 1111 1The paper is outlined as follows. In section 2, the database used is described and some general fea-
turesof thesyndicatedloanmarket arepresented.In section3, theeconometricapproachis explained
andthecorrespondingresultsarediscussed.Section4containsafurtherexplorationontheroleofcol-
lateral and on the results pointing to the presence of “home bias” in this market. Section 5 provides a
short elaboration on the quantification of country-specific effects in this framework. Finally, section 6
outlines the most salient conclusions.
2. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Accordingto the DealogicLoanwaredatabase, the main source for this work,the syndicatedloan mar-
ket for non-financial corporations has posted a remarkable growth at the global level over the last few
years,climbingfrom a total amount of dealsclosedof 1500billionseuro in 1999to 2700billionseuro in
2006.These recentdevelopments continueto shapeastructuralchangeinthismarket, whichwasfos-
tered in the 1980’s mostly as a means of developing countries’ sovereign financing. Further, in what
concerns non-financial corporations, this market has spread geographically very substantially: while
57 percent of money raised through loan syndicates were to US borrowers in 1999, this percentage
dropped to 40 percent in 2006. This decline occurred at the expense of a rise of the growth in the fi-
nancing of euro area residents in this market, whose share rose from 18 percent to 25 percent in the
same period, and the stronger presence of Asian residents in the international syndicated loans mar-
ket. The growth in the market concerning euro area borrowers has occurred essentially in the
non-rated borrowers’ segment, even though the predominance of non-rated borrowers is present at
the global level also. The enormous expansion in this market in the euro area recently raises the inter-
est of understanding its functioning, pricing mechanisms and the wayit organizes (see Rhodes (2006)
for the details of either the economic, legal aspects or conventions in this market, as well as a brief re-
view of its development over the last three decades). Even though no precise estimates of how much
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Annual accumulated new business volume (a)
Proportion of syndicated loans (right scale)
Sources: ECB and Dealogic Loanware.
























































1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total observations
Spread Obs. Spread Obs. Spread Obs. Spread Obs. Spread Obs. Spread Obs. Spread Obs. Spread Obs. of which:
rated
(1) (2) # (1) (2) # (1) (2) # (1) (2) # (1) (2) # (1) (2) # (1) (2) # (1) (2) #
Austria 0 188 121 4 189 180 9 0 363 379 6 247 130 5 191 101 4 16 16 1 29 2
Belgium 59 68 5 88 80 16 97 84 17 130 59 10 211 145 15 222 203 43 174 63 34 254 118 24 164 3
Ireland 170 127 15 209 171 10 161 178 8 258 337 13 165 167 19 164 154 20 280 138 7 236 253 36 128 27
Finland 154 108 10 150 98 12 168 94 18 73 58 6 202 73 6 130 67 13 81 48 25 215 91 17 107 16
France 144 70 128 149 61 149 147 76 125 198 133 173 224 156 114 214 69 219 210 66 329 233 110 367 1604 186
Germany 120 63 40 174 107 57 206 108 79 222 56 83 269 105 93 250 121 219 266 117 255 250 80 253 1079 148
Greece 95 58 20 97 86 14 112 82 21 127 76 29 143 118 30 165 149 20 188 163 21 135 89 10 165 14
Italy 95 94 55 146 61 58 150 116 53 131 104 57 180 147 108 212 165 147 183 144 215 199 164 108 801 48
Luxembourg 109 102 3 266 283 7 199 132 14 223 64 6 331 331 12 335 147 17 285 186 28 189 78 16 103 9
Neetherlands 125 78 50 156 71 80 187 119 59 186 96 49 268 213 77 211 106 78 228 172 96 281 201 134 623 88
Portugal 133 117 6 122 70 16 85 67 14 68 35 3 128 100 8 138 65 8 106 68 19 0 74 15
Spain 87 77 75 107 60 83 116 105 72 116 85 90 148 131 111 168 101 191 149 97 288 166 99 253 1163 49
Euro Area 120 74 407 144 75 506 155 103 489 173 94 519 210 149 599 211 106 980 201 102 1321 224 113 1219 6040 605
St-dev 87 101 109 124 176 173 185 187
Source: Dealogic Loanware.
Note: (1) Simple average; (2) Weighted average by loan amount.this type of financing represents in the European banks loan books, a rough estimate point to a dou-
bling of its importance between 1999 and 2006 (see Chart 1).
2
As stated above, this work was undertaken making use of the Dealogic Loanware database for syndi-
cated loans, identified at the operation level, granted to non-financial corporations domiciled in the
euro area in the period January1999 to October 2006. Further, loans withidentifiedpurposeas “public
finance” were disregarded and it was imposed that the information about pricing at issue (excluding
fees), loan amount and signing date (or at least funding date) wasavailable. After these requirements,
the database ended up with 6040 observations. Some aggregate statistics at the country and euro
area levels are shownin Table 1. Loans granted to corporates resident in France, Germany and Spain
are the most frequent, while borrowers in Portugal and Austria are the least frequent in the sample.
Further analysis was undertaken with loans drawn by firms for which explicit default risk information
was available (borrowers rated by either Standard&Poors or Moody’s). This implied a very significant
compression in the database, giving rise to a sample of 605 observations. Observations for Austria
and Belgium were very few; accordingly, the results concerning these countries must be interpreted
with particular caution.
3. ECONOMETRIC APPROACH
3.1. The general model and variables
Econometric regressions were performed with the interest rate spread as dependent variable. Dum-
mies for the country of residence and for the economic sector of the borrower, other borrower and op-
eration specific characteristics and time specific dummies were taken as explanatory variables. The
specification taken is as follows:
Spread country dummies dummies b jit j j         sector orrower
operation timedummies
j
i   	

(1)
The specificationin(1) wasestimatedbyOLS intwosamples:oneset of regressionsincludesallloans
in the database (after selection criteria), while the other restricts the sample to rated firms only. The
reasonwhythe analysiswasperformedfor both samplesis relatedto the fact that, in the databaseand
inlinewithwhatis observedingeneralinbanks’creditportfolio,onlya narrowsub-setof firms presents
information related to rating. Consequently, bias may be arising through the absence of control for the
market’s perceived risk of the borrowers in most operations. Analysing the narrower sample, in which
all firms considered have external rating, it is possible to appraise the relevance of the lack of rating in-
formation, as wellas to test whetherthe conclusions for the remaining characteristics are robust to the
omission of explicit controls for default risk in the regression concerning the larger sample.
In the appendix the variables used are explained. These include the usual determinants of the spread
appliedinloans.We focusontheinterestspreadoneachselectedloanoperation(Spread).
3 Loansize
was taken into account with dummies for the quartiles of the loan amount of the operation, sorted by
year (lncrp stands for the log of the loan amount, while lncrp25 is the dummy for operations in the first
quartile of the distribution of loan amounts in a given year). This variable controls for possible econo-
mies of scale in the designof the operation,witha higherdilutionof fixedcosts for larger operations.At
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(2) Asimpleratioofnewdealsannouncedeachyearandthecumulativeamountofnewbusinesstoeuroareacorporates,aspublishedbytheECB,pointstoan
average of around 7.5 percent of syndicated loans in the overall loans to non-financial corporations resident in the euro area.
(3) The actual unit of observation is the loan tranche. Each loan facility may include several loan tranches with possible different loan terms.the same time, the size of the operation can be a proxy for borrower size, allowing for the control of
systematic differences associated to firm size.
The rating at issue was aggregated into adjacent classes and included as a direct measure of credit
risk. Most operations involve unrated firms, while among rated ones, investment grade operations are
themostfrequentinthissample.
4 The maturityoftheoperationwassynthesizedintoclassesandintro-
duced into the regressionas dummyvariables. Alarge strand of literature focus on the relationshipbe-
tween maturity and loan spreads and it points to the existence of an upward sloping credit spread
curve over the maturity spectrum (see Jackson and Perraudin (1999) and related references). Hence,
operations with longer maturity are expected to be more expensive, irrespective of the shape of the
yield curve.
The announcedpurposeof theloan,witha dummyfor controllingfor thecaseswhenthis informationis
undisclosed, was taken also as a controlling variable. In particular, it is possible to identify in the data-
base loan operations whose proceeds were intended to finance take-overs or recapitalization of the
obligors (takeover), project finance and other specific purposes (project finance), very different by na-
ture from a general purpose loan or credit line (general).
A dummy variable specifying whether the loan is a credit line (credit lines), a term loan (term loan), a
bridge loan (bridge loan), a mezzanine loan (mezzanine) or other type of loan (other) was introduced.
In practice, the purpose of all mezzanine loans in the database was classified as takeover, so that this
loan type was considered as a sub-type of the takeover purpose. Previous research for the United
States point to the existence of a positive premium on term loans when compared to credit lines. This
empirical fact can be associated to the insurance role that credit lines offer to firms, when confronted
with adverse shocks, in conjugation with the liquidity provision service provided by banks by means of
this instrument (Berger and Udell (1992); Kashiap and Stein (2002)).
Fees (measured in basis points) accrued to loan arrangers, book runners and providers wereincluded
to control for possible substitution effects between fees for services and interest spread. In addition, a
distinction between commitment (commitment fees) and other types of fees (other fees) was consid-
ered. Further, a dummy for controlling whenever information on fees is undisclosed was also included
(fees undisclosed).
Dummies for the existence of guarantees (guarantor) and for the existence of collateral (collateral)a t -
tached to the operation were also considered. The sign of the impact of these factors on pricing is am-
biguousinlightof boththeoreticalconsiderationsandpreviousempiricalresearches.In whatconcerns
guarantees, it is our impression that they reflect chiefly support from entities in the same economic
group of the borrower, in particular a guarantee from the parent company to its subsidiary. As such, a
lower price was expected in association with the presence of guarantees. In what concerns loans se-
cured on collateral, all else equal, it is natural to expect that, by the time a delinquency event has al-
ready occurred, loans with collateral are less risky than the ones without it. Conversely, the ex-ante
relationshipbetweencollateral and risk (and subsequentlypricing) is not obvious. In fact, at the time of
approval of the loan, if all relevant characteristics of the borrower are not known to the lender, in some
circumstances, it may be more probable that collateral is demanded for those borrowers perceived as
riskier (Boot, Thakor and Udell (1991) for a thorough description of the relationship between risk and
collateral). Empirical results point to a positive relationship between collateral and risk (see Jiménez
andSaurina(2004)foralargesampleofSpanishdebtors);andcollateralandpricing(BergerandUdell
(1990) and Carey and Nini (2004) for the international syndicated market). Further, banks may de-
mand collateral as a substitute of ex-post monitoring efforts (Manove and Padilla (1999); Manove,
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(4) RatingscorrespondingtoinvestmentgradearethoseBBB-oraboveintheStandard&Poorsscale,whiletheremainingratingscorrespondtoborrowersor
debt issues which are commonly labelled as non-investment grade or with junk status.Padilla and Pagano (2001)). Other arguments point to the opposite direction, i.e. collateral may serve
as a screening device. The economic cost of pledging collateral is lowerfor lowrisk borrowersthan for
high risk ones, so that the former are willing to trade the pledging of collateral against a lower interest
rates (Besanko and Thakor (1987a,b)). Given this ambiguity, there was no a priori straightforward
expected role for collateral before the empirical approach was implemented.
The share-holding relationships of the borrowers with the general government were approached by
means of a dummy controlling for the public (public) versus private (private) control of the borrower.
Asymmetry of information between banks with a local presence and remote-located banks was taken
into account by attaching to each operation a dummy variable (labelled as home bias) for the cases
whenthe nationalityof all banks listed as providers of funds in the operationwasdifferent from the bor-
rower’s. Aset of dummiescontrollingfor industryandnationalityof the borrowerwerealso put in place,
even though their coefficients are not reported.
3.2. Results
Table 2 presents the results of the models using the full sample in columns (1) and (2) and the
sub-sampleof borrowerswithcreditratinginthecolumns(3) and(4). As describedbefore,theideaun-
derlying the running of parallel regressions with and without controlling for rating is to neglect direct in-
formationaboutborrowerrisk andto test if the generalconclusionsfor the remainingfactors are robust
to default risk measurement omission.
The main results of these regressions conform to the literature on the topic. For instance, the higher
the loansize, the lowerthe spread,most significantlywhencomparingthe quartileof the largestopera-
tions with the remaining.
5 This may be the result of economies of scale in the preparation of a syndi-
cated loan, i.e. there may be fixed costs, which can be diluted in larger loans. An alternative and more
plausible explanation is that loan size may be a proxy for borrower size, so that this variable captures
banks’ perceived lower risk in (very) large borrowers.
Loan ratings are intended to be ex-ante measures of default probability expectations, so that better
loan ratings should be associated with lowerspreads. The empirical findings in Table 2 indeed point to
such a relationship.In particular, rating seems to have a sizeablemarginalimpact on pricingfor ratings
below triple B class and insignificant among investment grade classes (between the best rating class
and BBB- class). Further, the spread paid by non-rated borrowers is slightly below the double B aver-
age, suggesting that, if rated, those firms would be, on average, at the margin between the BB+ and
the BBB- rating.
Spreads increase monotonically with maturity. In particular, spreads of operations with over 5 years
maturity (maturity > 5 years dummy variable, omitted in the regression) differ significantly from opera-
tions with lower maturities. In turn, operations with unknown or uncertain maturity (maturity unknown)
carry, on average, spreads which locate between the 1 to 5 years maturity class and the over 5 years
class. These results are indicative of no significant maturity bias in those operations, as the
above-mentioned classes are the most frequent in the sample.
According to the results of the regressions underlying Table 2, loans for takeover or recapitalization
purposes are perceived as riskier than all other. This is not surprising, since takeovers financed by
means of debt are conductive to increased leverage of the acquirer. Among these, the mezzanine
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(5) In fact, the variables representing the first three quartiles of loan size post very similar coefficients, suggesting that these dummies could be aggregated.
Anyway, the most general specification was kept in order to allow for the assessment of this feature in the remaining regressions.Economic Bulletin | Banco de Portugal




Dependent variable: Full sample Sample with rated borrowers only
Spread (1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Explanatory variables
Constant 38.42 4.11 85.27 12.35 53.20 2.88 50.15 2.61
2000 9.19 1.54 6.40 1.07 32.63 2.56 24.18 1.62
2001 14.68 2.47 12.36 2.07 28.29 2.14 15.22 1.01
2002 42.07 7.43 40.16 7.03 60.76 4.01 68.66 4.06
2003 57.94 9.88 57.54 9.74 44.27 3.16 60.69 3.92
2004 54.09 10.10 54.89 10.17 31.08 2.23 54.11 3.60
2005 40.90 7.92 41.38 7.95 -3.35 -0.25 11.46 0.76
2006 45.53 8.41 45.37 8.33 -14.34 -0.86 -6.08 -0.34
Loan size
lncrdp25 50.02 13.98 58.44 16.74 30.23 2.77 85.89 7.22
lncrdp50 50.01 13.19 57.48 15.46 4.46 0.52 46.96 4.46
lncrdp75 44.50 12.56 52.39 14.82 10.17 1.25 32.16 3.26
Rating
a -10.62 -1.20 - - -8.80 -1.02 - -
bb 84.21 7.37 - - 105.99 8.57 - -
b 103.37 8.74 - - 149.09 8.75 - -
no rating 57.54 8.14 ------
Maturity
maturity unknown -34.45 -2.67 -35.99 -2.79 -43.75 -2.24 -59.73 -2.13
maturity < 1 year -70.12 -13.25 -80.41 -15.18 -60.06 -5.29 -84.07 -6.48
maturity 1 up to 5 years -61.36 -21.45 -64.17 -22.17 -48.22 -5.83 -67.23 -7.51
Loan purpose
take over 45.79 14.62 47.59 15.00 20.77 2.93 33.07 3.92
mezzanine 583.17 25.12 582.65 25.09 575.22 4.12 578.98 3.64
asset backed -21.22 -2.42 -21.09 -2.43 1.22 0.04 -5.14 -0.15
project finance -14.86 -2.56 -9.38 -1.61 -56.63 -2.05 -10.42 -0.35
unknown 0.29 0.03 4.25 0.37 - -
Instrument type
credit lines -31.16 -14.31 -34.08 -15.47 -17.64 -2.80 -37.34 -5.27
bridge loan 31.32 2.81 32.19 2.81 121.24 2.87 102.75 2.39
other 75.52 7.01 69.88 6.32 27.76 1.57 16.78 0.86
Fees
commitment fees 0.18 3.35 0.21 3.96 -0.01 -0.07 0.36 1.64
other fees 0.36 2.69 0.46 3.26 0.66 1.87 1.22 3.32
fees undisclose -3.42 -0.42 -1.09 -0.14 26.35 0.56 44.87 1.14
Guarantor -30.04 -5.06 -28.31 -4.75 -20.89 -1.48 -26.92 -1.58
Collateral 11.97 3.50 15.03 4.33 39.35 2.62 61.95 3.56
Home bias 26.60 3.96 26.80 3.97 23.34 1.18 20.51 0.96
Public -36.64 -5.66 -46.30 -7.35 -2.75 -0.27 -22.25 -1.80
Number of observations 6040 6040 605 605
R-squared 0.68 0.67 0.75 0.66
Adj R-squared 0.68 0.67 0.72 0.63
Note: Borrower business and country dummies were included in the regression, but their coefficients are omitted in the present table.tranches are extremely expensive, posting a spread almost 6 percentage points higher than general
purpose loans.
Term loans (term loans, omitted in the regression) and most specially bridge loans (bridge loan) carry
higher spreads than credit lines (credit lines). Bridge loans are a way of interim financing that can be
assessed as embodying higher risk in the sense that are supposed to be replaced by more stable fi-
nancing still in preparation that may not materialize due to, inter alia, the deterioration in market condi-
tions. In what concerns the relative price of term loans and credit lines, the fact that the latter show up
to be cheaper is in line with other works carried on for the United States. In addition to what was out-
lined before about the insurance role of credit lines for firms, these instruments may have an hedging
interest for banks, in case there is positive correlation betweenshocks in deposit supplyand credit de-
mand. This hypothesis would mean that shocks to savers’ liquidity and to investors’ financing
requirements are positively correlated.
As expected, loan facilities carrying guarantees have lower spreads, while, in the sample under con-
sideration, collateral is positively related to loan spreads. This effect is stronger in specifications that
do not include rating as a regressor, whichis indicative of positive correlation betweenthe presence of
collateral and borrower default risk, i.e., those firms carrying worse credit rating are more likely to post
collateral when borrowing.
Entitiesownedorcontrolledbythegeneralgovernmentpaylessfortheirloansthantheirprivatepeers.
This result should be reflecting that the relationship with public administrations corresponds ultimately
to an implicit public guarantee.
The facilities in whichbanks withthe same nationalityof the borrowerdo not participate as providers of
funds in the primary market carry higher spreads. This variable (identified as home bias in Table 2) is
intended to account for the hypothesisthat domestic banks are better information processors than for-
eign banks. In this way, if there is no single bank with the same nationality of the borrower, that may
constitute a signal for all other potential participants that unknown information to them is biased to-
wardshigh risk. These results give support to the idea that, even in the syndicatedloans market, there
may be information asymmetries between local and foreign players in the credit market.
The results presented in Table 2 allowalso observing that loans with higher fees carry higher spreads,
i.e. fee business and pure intermediation seem to be complements rather than substitutes from the
perspective of banks’ revenues. In fact, in the full sample, 1 percentage point of additional fees (other
fess) corresponds to around 40 basis points of higher spread, and this result shows up to be slightly
stronger whenno control for rating is carried out. When restricting the analysisto rated borrowersonly,
the magnitude of the coefficient is significantlyhigher. This result is consistent withthose presented by
Angbazo et al (1998) in a sample of loans granted between 1987 and 1994.
Another piece of interesting information that can be inferred from the set of regressions is the identifi-
cation of a time-series credit cycle. The time dummies in the regression point to a hump shaped
time-seriesofspreads(withapeakin2003-2004),aftercontrollingfortheremainingfactors. This cycle
was not so evident when reading the average spreads presented in T able 1.
4. EXPLORING FURTHER THE ROLE OF COLLATERAL AND OF THE
“HOME BIAS” VARIABLE
In order to better understand the reasons behind the positive association between collateral pledging
and the interest spread applied on loans, a more detailed study of this effect was performed. This in-
volved running additionalregressions in whichother characteristics of the borrowersand/or the opera-
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describingloanpurpose,instrumenttype,borrowerratingandloansize wereput in place.Onlythe last
two characteristics showed up to be relevant in shedding additional light to this issue and the respec-
tive results are reported in Table 3 for the full sample
6. The results concerningthe associationbetween
the impact of the collateral and loan rating are under column (1) and are illustrative of the fact that the
positiveassociationis similar across rating classes. Column(2) presents the results of the regressions
exploring the role of loan size crossed with the variable concerning the presence of collateral. In all
specifications the positive association between collateral and spread appeared robust for the largest
loans (the 4th quartile, omitted in the regression), while there seems to be a general tendency for the
effect to disappear in smaller loans. To be sure, the coefficient of the dummy for the first quartile of the
loan size crossed with the dummy for the existence of collateral is statistically significant and close to
the symmetric of the coefficient of the collateral variable.
Asimilar procedure was undertaken trying to uncover what firm/operation characteristics could be as-
sociatedwiththepositiverelationshipfoundbetweenthenon-presenceofdomesticbanksinthesyndi-
cate (home bias) and loan spreads. The statistically significant differentiation in this effect was found
along the credit risk rating scale, with a strong differential effect in the double B rated borrowers, when
compared to triple B borrowers. As can be seen in column (3) in Table 3 the effect is not monotonic in
the rating scale and can be observed both in the full sample and in the sample with rated borrowers
only.
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Table 3
REGRESSION WITH INTERACTION TERMS FOR COLLATERAL AND HOME BIAS VARIABLES
Dependent variable: Spread (1) (2) (3)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Explanatory variables
lncrdp25 50.13 14.01 59.67 14.29 50.70 14.32
lncrdp50 50.22 13.22 53.86 12.01 50.75 13.60
lncrdp75 44.46 12.51 48.39 11.91 44.91 12.71
lncrdp25*collateral - - -35.52 -4.73 - -
lncrdp50*collateral - - -15.89 -1.97 - -
lncrdp75*collateral - - -16.38 -1.99 - -
a -10.64 -1.17 -10.00 -1.13 -5.34 -0.62
bb 83.78 6.37 82.51 7.25 74.90 7.11
b 90.71 7.22 99.19 8.40 113.68 8.75
no rating 59.49 8.18 55.23 7.79 58.35 7.79
collateral 34.63 1.29 30.25 4.93 11.86 3.47
a*collateral 18.84 0.49 ----
bb*collateral -14.14 -0.44 ----
b*collateral 18.26 0.53 ----
no rating*collateral -24.68 -0.91 ----
a*home bias ---- -68.78 -1.30
bb*home bias ---- 207.76 2.44
b*home bias ---- -46.30 -1.53
no rating*home bias ---- -8.74 -0.41
Note: The results concerning the remaining variables of the model were omitted for the sake of simplicity of reading of the interaction effects.
(6) The same analysis applied to the sub-sample of rated borrowers yielded similar results.5. WHAT CAN WE SAY ABOUT CROSS-COUNTRY DIFFERENCES?
In the rawdata, the difference betweenthe countrycarryingthe whole-samplehighest average spread
and the one with the lowest spread is as high as 150 basis points. Avery crude exercise of contrasting
the countrydummiesin the most generalmodel(reportedto in column(1) in Table2) suggests that this
metric compresses to less than 50 basis points. Additionally, the standard deviations of the country
dummies are only one third of the standard deviation of the spreads in the raw data, after scaling all
countries against France, the omitted country in the regression (Chart 2).
Wald tests on the joint statistical relevance of the coefficients underlying sets of characteristics of the
borrowersor operations wereperformed and are presented in Table 4. Borrowernationalitystands out
as significant in all specifications, giving further support for the conclusion that country-specific effects
still remain after taking into account the remaining borrower and loan operation characteristics.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This workprovidesanoverviewof empiricalfindingsfor thefactors underlyingthepricingof syndicated
loansinthe euroarea.The findingsfrom previousempiricalliteratureareconfirmedandthe results are
in linewithestablishedtheoreticalpredictionsin whatconcernsthe roleof maturity, loansize andcredit
risk rating. The results also show that collateral and guarantees matter differently in the pricing of cor-
porate loans with a positive association between spreads and collateral pledging and the opposite in
the case of guarantees. As such, it provides indications of important factors to take into consideration
when stratifying loan operations into homogeneous classes for the purpose of building up aggregate
interest rate statistics. Additionally, the approach allows for isolating country specific from
borrower/operation specific effects.
Further, some interesting stylizedfacts emerge whichdeserve future research, in order to identifytheir
underlyingreasons. First, fees seem to be complements to interest income for banks, rather than sub-
stitutes, as common wisdom would suggest and the literature on the role of up-front fees predicts. As
such, this issue deserves further analysis, taking into consideration that not all fees payable on a loan
contractarefront-endfees;rather,theyaccrueoverregularpaymentperiodsinthesamefashionasin-
terest. Second, there is some evidence of the presence of home bias in the syndicated loan market, in
the sense that loan facilities in which no bank with the same nationality as that of the borrowers are
more expensive than the remaining. This conclusion, if confirmed in subsequent work, suggests that
one should not be surprised by evidence of incomplete integration in the retail loan market in the euro
area. This is particularly relevant if one takes into consideration that the syndicated loan market is, by
its nature, a much more integrated and transparent market than that for bank loans in general. Accord-
ingly, a more detailed analysis crossing nationality and the roles of participating banks in each syndi-
cate, for instance distinguishing between arrangers of the operation and the remaining banks, may
provide finer conclusions about the structural factors underlying these findings.
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Chart 2






































































































Differences - raw data
Differences - regression without rating
Differences - regression with rating
Note:Countrydifferences stemmingfromtheregressionresultsasposted incolumns(1)
and (2) in Tables 2. Only Germany, Netherlands, Spain are statistically significant at 5%
significance level.
Table 4
WALD TESTS ON JOINT SIGNIFICANCE OF GROUP OF VARIABLES
Table 2
Group of variable Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (4)
Year
30.01 31.94 6.16 6.48
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Borrower nationality
13.95 13.56 3.80 5.09
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Loan size
85.73 122.38 2.98 18.12
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
Rating
45.57 - 30.80 -
0.00 - 0.00 -
Maturity
165.06 183.86 12.08 19.94
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Loan Purpose
181.67 180.96 8.60 7.56
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Instrument Type
103.55 110.67 9.62 15.48
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fees
6.76 9.44 1.29 5.97
(0.00) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00)
Borrower sector 17.00 18.52 3.59 4.70
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Wald test p-value are presented in parentesis.REFERENCES
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DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES
Variable Definition
Dependent variable
Spread Interest spread applied to loans (basis points)
Explanatory variables
Time Dummies
yeart Dummies equal to one if the loan takes place in year t (1999-2006)
Borrower specific variables
Borrower business 16 dummies variables representing the industry of the borrower
Nationality 12 dummies variables related with borrower’s nationality
Rating
a Dummy equals one if borrower rating is between AAA and A-
bbb Dummy equals one if borrower rating is between BBB+ and BBB- (omitted in regressions)
bb Dummy equals one if borrower rating is between BB+ and BB-
b Dummy equals one if borrower rating is between B+ and CCC+
no rating Dummy equals one if the borrower is not rated
Type of borrower
public Dummy equals one if the borrower is controlled by the general government
private Dummy equals one if the borrower is controlled by the private sector (omitted in regressions)
Operation specific variables
Loan size
lncrdp25 Dummy equals one if the loan is less than the percentile 25 of the loan size distribution (by year)
lncrdp50 Dummy equals one if the loan is between the percentile 25 and 50 of the loan size distribution (by year)
lncrdp75 Dummy equals one if the loan is between the percentile 50 and 75 of the loan size distribution (by year)
lncrdp100 Dummy equals one if the loan is grather than the percentile 75 of the loan size distribution (by year) - (omitted in the regression)
Maturity
maturity unknown Dummy equals one if the loan maturity is unknown
maturity <1 year Dummy equals one if the loan maturity is lower than or equal to 1 year
maturity 1 up to 5 years Dummy equals one if the loan maturity is higher than 1 year and lower than 5 years
maturity > 5 years Dummy equals one if the loan maturity is higher than 5 years (omitted in regressions)
Loan Purpose
takeover Dummy equals one if primary loan purpose is takeover or recapitalization
mezzanine Dummy equals one if among takeover or recapitalization operations the category is a mezzanine tranche
asset backed Dummy equals one if the loan is asset backed
project finance Dummy equals one if primary loan purpose is project finance
general Dummy equals one if primary loan purpose is general corporation purposes (omitted in regressions)
unknown Dummy equals one if primary loan purpose is unknown
Instrument Type
term loans Dummy equals one if the category is term loan (omitted in regressions)
credit lines Dummy equals one if the category is credit lines
bridge loans Dummy equals one if the category is bridge loan
mezzanine Dummy equals one if the category is mezzanine loan
other Dummy equals one if the category is another type of loan
Fees
commitment fees Commitment fees (basis points)
other fees Other fees (basis points)
fees undisclosed Dummy equals one if fees are undisclosed
Garantor Dummy equals one if there is a garantor in the operation
Collateral Dummy equals one if the loan is secured
Lenders nationality






















































DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Credit (€ m)
mean 245.72 378.11 282.12 317.73 187.36 193.61 261.26 305.84
[min; max] [0.23; 9424] [0.18; 20000] [ 1.02; 5000] [ 1.1; 10000] [ 1.35; 6148] [0.35; 7500] [0.53; 8000] [ 1; 21333]
Rating
a 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
bbb 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
bb 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
b 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
no rating 0.90 0.86 0.90 0.85 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.92
Maturity
maturity unknown 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
maturity < 1 year 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04
maturity 1 up to 5 years 0.32 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.21
maturity > 5 years 0.50 0.54 0.51 0.55 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.73
Loan Purpose
takeover 0.59 0.61 0.70 0.73 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.84
mezzanine 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05
asset backed 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
project finance 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.05
general 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.08
unknown 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Instrument Type
term loans 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.51 0.58 0.50 0.53
bridge loans 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
credit lines 0.43 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.42 0.35 0.38 0.34
other 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05
Fees
commitment fees (b.p.)
mean 11.13 14.16 16.63 15.45 18.17 10.20 8.75 6.50
[min; max] [ 0; 100] [ 0; 125] [ 0; 150] [ 0; 150] [ 0; 190] [ 0; 350] [ 0; 150] [ 0; 158]
other fees (b.p.)
mean 4.02 6.92 7.00 7.60 7.90 4.57 4.29 3.92
[min; max] [ 0; 85] [ 0; 100] [ 0; 162] [ 0; 300] [ 0; 270] [ 0; 160] [ 0; 145] [ 0; 360]
fees undisclose 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05
Garantor 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
Collateral 0.18 0.26 0.19 0.18 0.31 0.25 0.33 0.23
Type of borrower
public 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
private 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98
Lenders nationality
home bias 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.14
Note: In percent of the total number of observations unless otherwise stated.